Engineering the world's largest command and control system is a complex undertaking. This issue communicates the authors' experiences in the design of the next-generation air traffic control system. 14 W e started working on this issue with the objective of capturing 'V V our collective experiences in adapting and innovating modern computer science and system engineering techniques and methods to the problem of air traffic control systems design. We recognize that the Advanced Automation Program is a complex technological undertaking that requires government and industry to address issues and problems in system safety, reliability, long system life, architecture design, software engineering, and man-machine interface, or MMI, de- sign in very new and innovative ways. We look at this special issue as a vehicle for technology transfer to readers that are concerned not only with the development of a safe air traffic control system, but with the technologies used in the design, development, and implementation of large complex, highly available, and interactive systems.
Computer automation was introduced into en-route and terminal radar air traffic control centers in the early to mid-1970's. In the en-route centers flight data and radar data processing represent the key automation functions operating on IBM 9020 computers. Automated radar data processing and limited flight data readout and input capabilities are operational in systems known as automated radar terminal systems, or ARTS, II and III. The 0018-9162/87/020-0014501.00 © 1987 IEEE COMPUTER ARTS II system was implemented on Burroughs computers and the ARTS III/IIIA systems operate on Sperry Univac computers.
The Advanced Automation Program consists of two major Federal Aviation Administration, or FAA, system acquisitions. The first is the host program, which involves the replacement of current IBM 9020 computer systems at all en-route air traffic control centers. This acquisition was awarded (after a design competition) to IBM in July 1985. The second is the Advanced Automation System, or AAS, which replaces both the en-route and terminal approach control air traffic control, or ATC, computer systems over the next decade. The AAS Will provide the computers, software, and controller workstations (called sector suites) for integrated en-route and terminal radar ATC. The AAS will also include a tower control computer complex for use by the controllers in the tower cabs. This new system will replace the en-route and terminal ATC computers, flight strip printers and display equipment, and the backup radar display system.
The AAS program consists of a twophased government acquisition where the first phase includes a competitive design and prototype "fly-off" between two industrial teams lead by GM-Hughes Aircraft and IBM. The second phase consists of a winner-take-all production and implementation contract. (Because of the nature of the design competition we have taken great pains to avoid publication of technical data that might compromise the competition and proprietary rights of the competitors.) All of the articles in this special issue, with the exception of one, deal with the AAS program.
The FAA has accumulated a legacy of experiences in both ATC operations and software maintenance and test. The consensus has been that the new advanced ATC automation system must * provide a time-responsive set of ATC services (to the controller) that are highly available and feature inherent protection mechanisms to detect, contain, and recover from faults; * provide for evolution in ATC functions and capabilities without affecting safety and required redesign of the basic system; and * provide a user/computer interface that facilitates the evolution of the system and accommodates the basic manner in which the controller performs his or her ATC information processing tasks today.
Based on our past experiences and this consensus, we feel that risks that might result in either unsafe, unsuitable operations or costly high-risk technology are both real and must be eliminated or greatly reduced. We recognize that the AAS poses several challenges to the engineer and designer.
Since the inception of the AAS requirements definition effort over the past six years, significant progress has been made in MMI (also termed computerhuman interface) design and human engineering methods; computer workstation display technology; software engineering practices; tools; computer system performance modeling; and computer systemn fault tolerance. We have felt strongly that these practices, tools, and methods must be used in order to mitigate the critical technical risks associated with either a system design that inhibits system evolution or a user interface that is not acceptable to air traffic controllers.
Of paramount concern is the development of a safe system architecture that provides adequate coverage and protection from faults. In response to this latter concern the FAA has not only levied on the AAS stringent reliability and availability requirements, but has adopted standards and practices I aimed at the development of a highly reliable system.
The strategy selected by FAA to meet these unique requirements resulted in extensive focus on precontract requirements definition activities (prior to the design competition phase award) and prime contractor system design in the early part of the program. The articles in this issue address many of those activities undertaken prior to the start of the AAS Design Competition Phase in August 1984. Postcontract award activities have been described in the AAS Statement of Work. 2 The article also provides a background discussion (in vignette form) of the US air traffic control system to familiarize the reader with this application. In particular, the authors examine the technological demands that the AAS requirements place on the system designer.
The investment in time and money (estimated $2-3 billion) to design and implement such a system dictates balancing the factors of safety, reliability, and long system life. The current ATC automation systems will have been in service over 20 years when they are replaced by the Advanced Automation System, and there is no reason to suspect that the basic AAS system design and software will not have a 20-to 30-year life span.
Such factors place difficult demands on the system designer. The functions to be performed by the computer system (and, therefore, the man-machine interface), the external data sources (aircraft surveillance systems, weather sensors, navigation systems, etc.), as well as the traffic levels, air fleet niix, aircraft performance characteristics, and avionic capabilities all change over time. The AAS designers must ensure that this evolution can be accommodated at a reasonable cost and without detrimental impact on system reliability (hardware and software) and on the critical man-machine interface design.
A second demand on the system designer that stems from the long system life expectancy is the need to accommodate, without significant system perturbation, upgrades of hardware technology. This requirement stems from the fact that today's computer generation for large commercial systems are 4-7 years and even less in the rapidly expanding microprocessor area. describes the approach used to evaluate system architectures. This process should prove useful to those interested in both the development and design validation of complex systems. Because of the nature of the AAS design competition, this article has avoided mentioning specifics concerning each prime contractor's architecture. What is noteworthy is that the application of a formal evaluation process is essential to determining that the system design (as proposed) satisfies AAS requirements.
Clearly the basic system design, in terms of both hardware and software structure, will have to remain intact for the total system life. So an important evaluation method must qualitatively examine how the system is expected to be augmented and modified as the system evolves. To make this possible, FAA has required that the system be designed around a local communications network (with the requisite reliability characteristics) based on local area network technology and industry-accepted protocol standards. This will allow the introduction of new hardware technology without major system perturbations. To complement the hardware strategy, software will be functionally distributed and, perhaps more importantly, developed in a single high-order language (such as Ada) that permits easy migration from one processor to another. An important criterion in the evaluation of proposed architectures will be the impact of change on system stability since the ATC application cannot tolerate degradation in system reliability and availability during and after a change.
Controller MMI and operational su-itability
An operative phrase used in connection with the AAS is "operational suitability. " While the value of accurately capturing user knowledge and infusing this knowledge into the AAS system development process is clear enough, the process of doing this can be quite a bit more complex than it may seem. Users may be biased by their own limited experience with particular design features, peculiarities of their operations at a given air traffic sector, or the interaction techniques they employ when using the system. Users also tend to offer isolated "fixes" to perceived problems, rather than to regard functions in the context of system design decisions that respond to functional and performance requirements. Lastly 
